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Mr. McLean

2 3rd Ministerial

Meeting (March 1954)
Conference

June 18, 1954

MEMO ANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM : Gerard C. Smith

SUBJECT: Understanding on Military Access if
Conference Breaks Down

1. If the Foreign Ministers' meeting breaks
hard: (i.e., without an early reconvening date):

a. The Summit will go out the window,
and we will have trouble with Macmillan (and/or
he will have trouble with the U.K. electorate)
on this point, unless we reverse our position to date.

b. The Soviets may well turn over
military access functions to the East Germans,
and we shall have to execute present allied
contingency plans (on the basis - I believe -
of a very uncertain allied willingness to face
the dangers that are likely to arise in the
course of such execution).

2. If it looks as though we are headed for
a hard break, therefore, it might be worth making
a last minute effort to reach an agreement on
the military access question alone, with the
understanding that this would represent enough
progress to justify a Summit.

a. The purpose of the agreement would
be both to tide us over the dangers that would be
created by an East German take-over in the absence
of any prior understanding as to access procedures
and to enable the Heads of Government to meet free
from any threat that our access would be gag-

paralyzed if the meeting

S/P. Gerard C. Smith

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pardized if the meeting failed.

b. Duration of the agreement would be limited to the period until a broader Berlin settlement is concluded.

c. Its provisions would be very simple: that existing military access procedures should be maintained (whether or not some of these procedures are performed by Germans), and that any disputes concerning observance of the agreement should be settled by a Four Power Complaint Commission.

d. It would be clearly understood that this limited scope of the agreement was without prejudice to our position on the other issues which we and the Soviets would have to resolve in order to conclude a comprehensive agreement on Berlin.

3. Such an agreement would be to our advantage in meeting the problems referred to in paragraph 1. The Soviets would probably not be interested, but there is a bare possibility that they might accept in order to get a summit. If they turned it down, I don't see that we would have lost anything by trying.

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